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Should	the	government	be	able	to	suspend
parliament?
Petra	Schleiter	and	Thomas	Fleming	examine	the	power	to	prorogue	Parliament.
They	outline	the	legal	basis	of	prorogation,	survey	its	uses	in	the	UK	and	other
Westminster	systems,	and	discuss	how	the	UK	rules	could	be	reformed.
The	UK	government	has	the	power	to	suspend	parliament,	in	a	process	known	as
‘prorogation’.	Prorogation	is	usually	a	routine	measure,	used	to	schedule	gaps
between	sessions	of	parliament.	But	it	became	highly	controversial	in	2019,	when	the	government	tried	to	prorogue
parliament	for	five	weeks	shortly	before	the	scheduled	Brexit	date	of	31	October.	This	decision	caused	uproar,	and
was	ultimately	quashed	by	the	Supreme	Court.
This	controversy	prompted	discussion	of	whether	the	UK’s	prorogation	rules	should	be	reformed.	In	particular,
some	have	asked	whether	this	power	should	be	considered	as	part	of	the	forthcoming	review	of	the	Fixed-term
Parliaments	Act	2011,	which	is	legally	required	to	take	place	this	year.	Here	we	outline	the	consequences	of	the
current	rules,	showing	that	they	are	unusual,	and	suggesting	possible	ways	for	them	to	be	reformed.	Fuller	versions
of	our	arguments	can	be	found	in	our	recent	articles	in	Political	Quarterly	and	Parliamentary	Affairs	(forthcoming).
What	are	the	consequences	of	the	current	prorogation	rules?
Prorogation	ends	a	parliamentary	session.	It	means	that	neither	House	of	Parliament	may	sit,	and	parliamentary
business	is	almost	entirely	suspended.	Though	prorogation	is	formally	a	prerogative	power	of	the	monarch,	she
acts	on	the	advice	of	the	Prime	Minister.	In	practice,	therefore,	the	timing	and	length	of	prorogation	are	decided	by
the	government.	Parliament	has	no	power	to	insist	on	sitting	once	it	has	been	prorogued	–	only	the	government	can
shorten	or	prolong	a	prorogation.
This	situation	makes	it	possible	for	the	government	to	use	prorogation	for	political	purposes	when	its	interests
conflict	with	those	of	parliament.	Three	such	purposes	stand	out.	First,	the	government	might	prorogue	parliament
to	avoid	facing	a	motion	of	no	confidence.	A	prorogation	of	this	kind	caused	significant	controversy	in	Canada	in
2008.	Second,	the	government	might	use	prorogation	to	pursue	a	policy	for	which	there	is	no	parliamentary	support.
Such	motives	appeared	to	underpin	the	controversial	2019	prorogation,	which	limited	MPs’	ability	to	oppose	the
government’s	policy	of	leaving	the	EU	without	a	deal	if	none	were	agreed.	Third,	prorogation	might	be	used	to	avoid
the	publication	of	politically	embarrassing	reports	or	documents.	John	Major	was	accused	of	this	when	a
prorogation	shortly	before	the	1997	general	election	delayed	publication	of	a	report	into	the	‘cash	for	questions’
scandal.
All	of	these	possibilities	are	normatively	undesirable.	This	is	because	they	conflict	with	the	essential	principle
underlying	parliamentary	democracy:	executive	accountability	to	parliament.	In	parliamentary	systems	like	the	UK,
the	government	has	no	direct	democratic	mandate.	Instead,	its	authority	to	govern	rests	on	having	the	support	of
MPs.	This	gives	parliament	the	right	to	scrutinize	the	government,	and	to	remove	it	through	a	vote	of	no	confidence
if	it	wishes.	But	these	rights	cannot	be	exercised	while	parliament	is	suspended.
How	unusual	are	these	rules?
As	well	as	being	normatively	undesirable,	the	UK’s	current	prorogation	rules	are	highly	unusual	when	compared	to
other	European	parliamentary	democracies.	Other	‘Westminster’	democracies,	such	as	Canada	or	Australia,	have
very	similar	rules	to	the	UK.	But	most	European	democracies	give	parliament	the	right	to	insist	on	sitting.	Our
analysis	of	rules	in	26	other	European	democracies	suggests	that	the	overwhelming	majority	allow	either	the
Speaker	or	a	majority	of	MPs	to	call	a	sitting.	Many	countries	even	grant	a	similar	power	to	a	minority	of	MPs.
Moreover,	these	rules	are	usually	entrenched	in	national	constitutions,	which	makes	them	hard	to	change.	The
European	norm	is	therefore	for	parliaments	to	have	constitutionally-enshrined	protections	against	being	suspended.
The	UK’s	prorogation	rules	make	it	a	significant	outlier	in	this	regard.
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The	UK’s	prorogation	rules	are	also	unusual	when	considered	in	the	context	of	recent	trends	within	this	country	in
the	relationship	between	the	government	and	parliament.	The	declining	frequency	of	single-party	majority
governments,	coupled	with	increasing	rates	of	rebellion	by	backbenchers,	have	forced	ministers	to	negotiate	more
with	other	parties	and	with	their	own	MPs.	Recent	institutional	changes	also	mean	governments	now	face	stronger
select	committees	and	a	more	assertive	House	of	Lords.	Finally,	the	Fixed-term	Parliaments	Act	2011	removed	the
prime	minister’s	power	to	call	early	elections,	handing	it	to	MPs	instead.	All	of	these	changes	have	strengthened
parliament	at	the	expense	of	the	government.	The	UK’s	unreformed	prorogation	rules	clearly	stand	out	against	this
trend.
How	could	these	rules	be	reformed?
The	UK’s	prorogation	rules	give	the	government	troubling	levels	of	power	to	sidestep	parliament.	This	puts	them	out
of	step	with	other	European	parliamentary	democracies,	and	with	recent	British	trends	in	the	relationship	between
government	and	parliament.	Given	this,	how	might	the	rules	be	changed?
Reforming	the	prorogation	rules	would	require	them	to	be	formally	codified	in	legislation.	This	is	because
prorogation	is	currently	a	prerogative	power,	so	its	limits	and	uses	are	not	explicitly	regulated	in	any	one	document.
Such	legislation	could	reduce	the	government’s	control	of	prorogation	in	a	number	of	ways.	Most	obviously,
parliament	could	be	given	the	power	to	prorogue	and/or	un-prorogue	itself.	Alternatively,	any	new	legislation	could
set	some	explicit	limits	on	the	permitted	length	or	purpose	of	prorogation.	Comparing	these	two	approaches,	the
latter	has	the	downside	of	giving	future	MPs	less	flexibility	to	determine	what	constitutes	an	(un)acceptable
prorogation.
Any	reforms	along	these	lines	would	have	two	potential	benefits.	Most	importantly,	they	would	limit	the
government’s	ability	to	use	prorogation	as	a	tool	for	evading	parliamentary	scrutiny	and	accountability,	or	governing
without	the	confidence	of	parliament.	But	they	might	also	help	to	reduce	future	tension	between	ministers	and
judges.	The	government	fiercely	criticised	the	Supreme	Court	for	their	2019	prorogation	ruling.	Giving	MPs	a	direct
role	in	shaping	prorogation	would	reduce	the	need	for	similar	court	cases	in	the	future.
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